Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach

Network users can choose among different security solutions to protect their data. Those solutions are offered by competing providers, with possibly different performance and price levels. In this paper, we model the interactions among users as a noncooperative game, with a negative externality coming from the fact that attackers target popular systems to maximize their expected gain. Using a nonatomic weighted congestion game model for user interactions, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a user equilibrium, compute the corresponding Price of Anarchy, that is the loss of efficiency due to user selfishness, and investigate some consequences for the (higher-level) pricing game played by security providers.Game theory;Weighted games; Security

Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid

The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page

Regulating transmission in a spatial oligopoly: a numerical illustration for Belgium

This paper introduces strategic behavior of the electricity network operator in a congested network with imperfect competition for generation. It models a two stage Stackelberg game. First, the network operator sets transmission prices, then generators set output and sales. Several scenarios for the generation market structure and the behavior of the network operator are compared numerically. The calibration of the numerical model is based on data of the Belgian electricity market.Regulation, Transmission, Electricity, Cournot, Numerical model, Security constraints, MPEC, loadflow, Belgium

Advanced Drone Swarm Security by Using Blockchain Governance Game

This research contributes to the security design of an advanced smart drone swarm network based on a variant of the Blockchain Governance Game (BGG), which is the theoretical game model to predict the moments of security actions before attacks, and the Strategic Alliance for Blockchain Governance Game (SABGG), which is one of the BGG variants which has been adapted to construct the best strategies to take preliminary actions based on strategic alliance for protecting smart drones in a blockchain-based swarm network. Smart drones are artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled drones which are capable of being operated autonomously without having any command center. Analytically tractable solutions from the SABGG allow us to estimate the moments of taking preliminary actions by delivering the optimal accountability of drones for preventing attacks. This advanced secured swarm network within AI-enabled drones is designed by adapting the SABGG model. This research helps users to develop a new network-architecture-level security of a smart drone swarm which is based on a decentralized network.Comment: Song-Kyoo Kim, Advanced Drone Swarm Security by Using Blockchain Governance Game, Mathematics 10:18 (2022), 333