Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games

The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games

Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality

Model checking coalitional games in shortage resource scenarios

Verification of multi-agents systems (MAS) has been recently studied taking into account the need of expressing resource bounds. Several logics for specifying properties of MAS have been presented in quite a variety of scenarios with bounded resources. In this paper, we study a different formalism, called Priced Resource-Bounded Alternating-time Temporal Logic (PRBATL), whose main novelty consists in moving the notion of resources from a syntactic level (part of the formula) to a semantic one (part of the model). This allows us to track the evolution of the resource availability along the computations and provides us with a formalisms capable to model a number of real-world scenarios. Two relevant aspects are the notion of global availability of the resources on the market, that are shared by the agents, and the notion of price of resources, depending on their availability. In a previous work of ours, an initial step towards this new formalism was introduced, along with an EXPTIME algorithm for the model checking problem. In this paper we better analyze the features of the proposed formalism, also in comparison with previous approaches. The main technical contribution is the proof of the EXPTIME-hardness of the the model checking problem for PRBATL, based on a reduction from the acceptance problem for Linearly-Bounded Alternating Turing Machines. In particular, since the problem has multiple parameters, we show two fixed-parameter reductions.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2013, arXiv:1307.416

Reasoning about Dependence, Preference and Coalitional Power

This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic and coalitional forms is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference

Reducing Validity in Epistemic ATL to Validity in Epistemic CTL

We propose a validity preserving translation from a subset of epistemic Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) to epistemic Computation Tree Logic (CTL). The considered subset of epistemic ATL is known to have the finite model property and decidable model-checking. This entails the decidability of validity but the implied algorithm is unfeasible. Reducing the validity problem to that in a corresponding system of CTL makes the techniques for automated deduction for that logic available for the handling of the apparently more complex system of ATL.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007