Agent-Based Simulations of Blockchain protocols illustrated via Kadena's Chainweb

While many distributed consensus protocols provide robust liveness and consistency guarantees under the presence of malicious actors, quantitative estimates of how economic incentives affect security are few and far between. In this paper, we describe a system for simulating how adversarial agents, both economically rational and Byzantine, interact with a blockchain protocol. This system provides statistical estimates for the economic difficulty of an attack and how the presence of certain actors influences protocol-level statistics, such as the expected time to regain liveness. This simulation system is influenced by the design of algorithmic trading and reinforcement learning systems that use explicit modeling of an agent's reward mechanism to evaluate and optimize a fully autonomous agent. We implement and apply this simulation framework to Kadena's Chainweb, a parallelized Proof-of-Work system, that contains complexity in how miner incentive compliance affects security and censorship resistance. We provide the first formal description of Chainweb that is in the literature and use this formal description to motivate our simulation design. Our simulation results include a phase transition in block height growth rate as a function of shard connectivity and empirical evidence that censorship in Chainweb is too costly for rational miners to engage in. We conclude with an outlook on how simulation can guide and optimize protocol development in a variety of contexts, including Proof-of-Stake parameter optimization and peer-to-peer networking design.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figures, accepted to the IEEE S&B 2019 conferenc

PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN SCALABILITY: ADVANCEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE

In the last decade, blockchain has emerged as one of the most influential innovations in software architecture and technology. Ideally, blockchains are designed to be architecturally and politically decentralized, similar to the Internet. But recently, public and permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have faced stumbling blocks in the form of scalability. Both Bitcoin and Ethereum process fewer than 20 transactions per second, which is significantly lower than their centralized counterpart such as VISA that can process approximately 1,700 transactions per second. In realizing this hindrance in the wide range adoption of blockchains for building advanced and large scalable systems, the blockchain community has proposed first- and second-layer scaling solutions including Segregated Witness (Segwit), Sharding, and two-way pegged sidechains. Although these proposals are innovative, they still suffer from the blockchain trilemma of scalability, security, and decentralization. Moreover, at this time, little is known or discussed regarding factors related to design choices, feasibility, limitations and other issues in adopting the various first- and second-layer scaling solutions in public and permissionless blockchains. Hence, this thesis provides the first comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art first- and second-layer scaling solutions for public and permissionless blockchains, identifying current advancements and analyzing their impact from various viewpoints, highlighting their limitations and discussing possible remedies for the overall improvement of the blockchain domain

Designing a Blockchain Model for the Paris Agreement’s Carbon Market Mechanism

This paper examines the benefits and constraints of applying blockchain technology for the Paris Agreement carbon market mechanism and develops a list of technical requirements and soft factors as selection criteria to test the feasibility of two different blockchain platforms. The carbon market mechanism, as outlined in Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, can accelerate climate action by enabling cooperation between national Parties. However, in the past, carbon markets were limited by several constraints. Our research investigates these constraints and translates them into selection criteria to design a blockchain platform to overcome these past limitations. The developed selection criteria and assumptions developed in this paper provide an orientation for blockchain assessments. Using the selection criteria, we examine the feasibility of two distinct blockchains, Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric, for the specific use case of Article 6.2. These two blockchain systems represent contrary forms of design and governance; Ethereum constitutes a public and permissionless blockchain governance system, while Hyperledger Fabric represents a private and permissioned governance system. Our results show that both blockchain systems can address present carbon market constraints by enhancing market transparency, increasing process automation, and preventing double counting. The final selection and blockchain system implementation will first be possible, when the Article 6 negotiations are concluded, and governance preferences of national Parties are established. Our paper informs about the viability of different blockchain systems, offers insights into governance options, and provides a valuable framework for a concrete blockchain selection in the future.DFG, 414044773, Open Access Publizieren 2019 - 2020 / Technische Universität Berli

Towards Scaling Blockchain Systems via Sharding

Existing blockchain systems scale poorly because of their distributed consensus protocols. Current attempts at improving blockchain scalability are limited to cryptocurrency. Scaling blockchain systems under general workloads (i.e., non-cryptocurrency applications) remains an open question. In this work, we take a principled approach to apply sharding, which is a well-studied and proven technique to scale out databases, to blockchain systems in order to improve their transaction throughput at scale. This is challenging, however, due to the fundamental difference in failure models between databases and blockchain. To achieve our goal, we first enhance the performance of Byzantine consensus protocols, by doing so we improve individual shards' throughput. Next, we design an efficient shard formation protocol that leverages a trusted random beacon to securely assign nodes into shards. We rely on trusted hardware, namely Intel SGX, to achieve high performance for both consensus and shard formation protocol. Third, we design a general distributed transaction protocol that ensures safety and liveness even when transaction coordinators are malicious. Finally, we conduct an extensive evaluation of our design both on a local cluster and on Google Cloud Platform. The results show that our consensus and shard formation protocols outperform state-of-the-art solutions at scale. More importantly, our sharded blockchain reaches a high throughput that can handle Visa-level workloads, and is the largest ever reported in a realistic environment.Comment: This is an updated version of the Chain of Trust: Can Trusted Hardware Help Scaling Blockchains? paper. This version is to be appeared in SIGMOD 201

A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks

© 2013 IEEE. The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of decentralized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review of the strategy adopted for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey of the emerging applications of blockchain networks in a broad area of telecommunication. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions

Divide and Scale: Formalization of Distributed Ledger Sharding Protocols

Sharding distributed ledgers is the most promising on-chain solution for scaling blockchain technology. In this work, we define and analyze the properties a sharded distributed ledger should fulfill. More specifically, we show that a sharded blockchain cannot be scalable under a fully adaptive adversary, but it can scale up to $O(n/\log n)$ under an epoch-adaptive adversary. This is possible only if the distributed ledger creates succinct proofs of the valid state updates at the end of each epoch. Our model builds upon and extends the Bitcoin backbone protocol by defining consistency and scalability. Consistency encompasses the need for atomic execution of cross-shard transactions to preserve safety, whereas scalability encapsulates the speedup a sharded system can gain in comparison to a non-sharded system. We introduce a protocol abstraction and highlight the sufficient components for secure and efficient sharding in our model. In order to show the power of our framework, we analyze the most prominent shared blockchains (Elastico, Monoxide, OmniLedger, RapidChain) and pinpoint where they fail to meet the desired properties

Low-resource eclipse attacks on Ethereum’s peer-to-peer network

We present eclipse attacks on Ethereum nodes that exploit the peer-to-peer network used for neighbor discovery. Our attacks can be launched using only two hosts, each with a single IP address. Our eclipse attacker monopolizes all of the victim’s incoming and outgoing connections, thus isolating the victim from the rest of its peers in the network. The attacker can then filter the victim’s view of the blockchain, or co-opt the victim’s computing power as part of more sophisticated attacks. We argue that these eclipse-attack vulnerabilities result from Ethereum’s adoption of the Kademlia peer-to-peer protocol, and present countermeasures that both harden the network against eclipse attacks and cause it to behave differently from the traditional Kademlia protocol. Several of our countermeasures have been incorporated in the Ethereum geth 1.8 client released on February 14, 2018.First author draf