Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper

Child development and the aims of road safety education

Pedestrian accidents are one of the most prominent causes of premature injury, handicap and death in the modern world. In children, the problem is so severe that pedestrian accidents are widely regarded as the most serious of all health risks facing children in developed countries. Not surprisingly, educational measures have long been advocated as a means of teaching children how to cope with traffic and substantial resources have been devoted to their development and provision. Unfortunately, there seems to be a widespread view at the present time that education has not achieved as much as had been hoped and that there may even be quite strict limits to what can be achieved through education. This would, of course, shift the emphasis away from education altogether towards engineering or urban planning measures aimed at creating an intrinsically safer environment in which the need for education might be reduced or even eliminated. However, whilst engineering measures undoubtedly have a major role to play in the effort to reduce accidents, this outlook is both overly optimistic about the benefits of engineering and overly pessimistic about the limitations of education. At the same time, a fresh analysis is clearly required both of the aims and methods of contemporary road safety education. The present report is designed to provide such an analysis and to establish a framework within which further debate and research can take place

Thinking as mental model-building: a Piagetian-cum-mechanistic explanation of the 'engram'

Piaget (like Skinner) appears to deny the relevance or possibility of describing thought in mechanistic terms. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to outline one way in which this might be done for Piaget's concepts. Three domains or "worlds" are considered (following both Piaget and Popper); Reality and the senses, thought proper, and a symbolic domain (divided into [a] internal, and [b] external). Within the second domain are linear codings (pre-set but changeable) which can comprise "schemes" when activated synchonously in sufficient numbers. Non-linear schemes and schemata are explicable in tems of "sub-programming" and "cross-referencing". Elementary units for schemata may be scheme-elements (or ensembles of them) which have become more or less permanently stabilized due to their self-sustaining cross-references. These inhabit the symbolic domain ("world 3a")

Short papers and letters on the 'linear micro-element' theory of mental mechanism; and related questions of scientific method

Seven papers/letters further developing the ideas raised in Monographs #12 and #15 (q.v.), and in two papers published in Kybernetes (vols 5 and 7) -- later incorporated into the Thesis (q.v.) as "Part A". In particular: *Chapters I & VI: apply the postulated 'linear elements' to explain Piaget's notion of how the mental concept of 'object' is developed. *Chapter II: extends this to account for the rudiments of 'personal identity'. *Chapter III: answers criticisms and queries raised by Dr N.E.Wetherick, mainly on the plausibility of RNA and infra-red as a Second (multiplexed) Neurotransmitting System. *Other chapters offer critiques of some accepted views on scientific method

LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PARTITIONING OF MIND: DEPICTING THE SAME MAP?

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that empirically delimited structures of mind are also differentiable by means of systematic logical analysis. In the sake of this aim, the paper first summarizes Demetriou's theory of cognitive organization and growth. This theory assumes that the mind is a multistructural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialized structural systems (SSSs) that guide processing within different reality and knowledge domains, and a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. In the second part the paper focuses on the SSSs, which are the target of our logical analysis, and it summarizes a series of empirical studies demonstrating their autonomous operation. The third part develops the logical proof showing that each SSS involves a kernel element that cannot be reduced to standard logic or to any other SSS. The implications of this analysis for the general theory of knowledge and cognitive development are discussed in the concluding part of the paper

Modelling individual variability in cognitive development

Investigating variability in reasoning tasks can provide insights into key issues in the study of cognitive development. These include the mechanisms that underlie developmental transitions, and the distinction between individual differences and developmental disorders. We explored the mechanistic basis of variability in two connectionist models of cognitive development, a model of the Piagetian balance scale task (McClelland, 1989) and a model of the Piagetian conservation task (Shultz, 1998). For the balance scale task, we began with a simple feed-forward connectionist model and training patterns based on McClelland (1989). We investigated computational parameters, problem encodings, and training environments that contributed to variability in development, both across groups and within individuals. We report on the parameters that affect the complexity of reasoning and the nature of ‘rule’ transitions exhibited by networks learning to reason about balance scale problems. For the conservation task, we took the task structure and problem encoding of Shultz (1998) as our base model. We examined the computational parameters, problem encodings, and training environments that contributed to variability in development, in particular examining the parameters that affected the emergence of abstraction. We relate the findings to existing cognitive theories on the causes of individual differences in development

Getting one step closer to deduction: Introducing an alternative paradigm for transitive inference

This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published article is available from the link below. Copyright @ 2008 Psychology Press.Transitive inference is claimed to be “deductive”. Yet every group/species ever reported apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve five-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible. Response accuracy and RT (non-discriminative nRT) were measured as is typically done. We also measured RT confined to correct responses (cRT). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena emerged. The symbolic distance effect never extended to premise recall and was not at all evident for nRT; suggesting the use of non-deductive end-anchor strategies. For overall performance, and particularly the critical B?D inference, our findings indicate that deductive transitive inference is far more intellectually challenging than previously thought. Contrasts of our present findings against previous findings suggest at least two distinct transitive inference modes, with most research and most computational models to date targeting an associative mode rather than their desired deductive mode. This conclusion fits well with the growing number of theories embracing a “dual process” conception of reasoning. Finally, our differing findings for nRT versus cRT suggest that researchers should give closer consideration to matching the RT measure they use to the particular conception of transitive inference they pre-held

On "missing the point" : a defence of Seymour Papert's "exercise in an applied genetic epistemology"

A Research report suhmitted to the Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education by coursework. Johannesburg 1992This research report defends Seymour Papert's assertion that LOGO researchers 'have "missed the point" of the philosophy which underpins the, LOGO learning environment. It establishes continuities between Papert's "exercise in an applied genetic epistemology" and Jea:rl' Piagetl"s genetic epistemology. G\iven"this relationship the report argues that Papert's theory and rese#rch should be. :-' located within the p,~agetian research prograllune. From this perspective Papert IS assertiol1 is justified to the extent that LOGO researchers have "missed the point" of his epistemolo~ical concerns and misconstrued the constructivist nature of the LOGO learning environment

Getting to the heart of clinical supervision: a theoretical review of the role of emotions in professional development

Background The importance of supervision is increasingly recognized, yet it remains little understood, impairing research and practice. Specifically, the CBT supervision model provides a relatively “heartless” account of professional development, which may undermine its effectiveness. Method A theoretical review of emotions in supervision and learning is provided, to summarize relevant theoretical and empirical literature. The objectives are to clarify the role of emotions in CBT supervision, and to use this understanding to outline an emotionally-attuned model, illustrating its application to two critical aspects of CBT supervision (the development of a learning alliance and enhancing professional competence). Conclusion The reviewed literature (theory and research evidence) supports the explicit and systematic incorporation of emotions into CBT supervision. Conceptually, this can be achieved by integrating Lazarus's (1991) general theory of emotion with the CBT model. The illustrations of this augmented model indicate its value in understanding and managing both the “rupture-repair” cycle that can affect the supervisory alliance, and the “deskilling-development” pattern that appears to be necessary for the acquisition of competence. We propose that CBT supervision might usefully be guided by our expanded model, as this affords greater internal consistency and may be more effective educationally