Pure Politics

The present Supreme Court has been noticeably unreceptive to legal claims asserted by racial minorities. Although it is always possible to articulate nonracial motives for the Court\u27s civil rights decisions, the popular perception is that a politically conservative majority wishing to cut back on the protection minority interests receive at majority expense now dominates the Supreme Court. In reviewing the work of the Court during its 1988 Term, The United States Law Week reported that [a] series of civil rights decisions by a conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court making it easier to challenge affirmative action programs and more difficult to establish claims of employment discrimination highlighted the 1988-89 term\u27s labor and employment cases. U.S. Law Week went on to cite seven decisions handed down that Term that adversely affected minority interests

The Comparative Political Economy of Economic Geography

This paper examines how different electoral rules affect the location decisions of firms through the effect on regional policy. The equilibrium location of industry in the economically smaller (larger) region is higher under majoritarian (proportional) elections. The standard prediction in the economic geography literature, that the larger region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced, no longer holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the smaller region is increasing in the level of regional integration. As trade is in- creasingly liberalized, the economy features a reversed core-periphery equilibrium. This result holds under both electoral rules. However, firms locate to the smaller region at a relatively higher rate in the case of majoritarian voting, hence, the reversed equilibrium occurs for a relatively lower level of regional integration with majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence shows that the model is consistent with qualitative features of the data, and the results are robust to an instrumental variable strategy that accounts for the potential endogeneity of the electoral rule.Economic Geography; Regional Policy; Electoral Rules

Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs

Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability. --trade policy,political economy,representative democracy

The Problem of Democracy in Contexts of Polarization

In this paper I argue that contemporary democracies all over the world are more polarized than ever and intend to analyze not only the conditions of possibility of a democracy, in general, and in contexts of polarization, in particular, but also the relationship between democracy and polarization. My claim is that polarization, if certain conditions are met, more than a problem it is a great opportunity to democracy and a greater democratization. Hence, I bring to mind that it was Ronald Dworkin, who recently asked about the conditions of possibility of a democracy and its relationship with polarization by developing a partnership conception of democracy in contraposition to the majoritarian conception. Besides, I call into attention the classics that have emphasized the relationship between democracy and polarization, since Robert A. Dahl coined the term ‘polyarchy’, such as Samuel P Huntington and Norberto Bobbio. Finally, I conclude that against all odds polarization is a great opportunity for democracy and a greater democratization

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Also other political variables appear to affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.political economy, shareholder protection, corporate governance, employment legislation, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions.

Neutralizing Grutter

Part I of this article argues that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional competence to formulate racial policy for the nation, and highlights the tension that exists between the Court\u27s abstract preference for race neutrality and the concrete reality of contemporary race relations, in which dedicated efforts to promote racial balance offer the only meaningful hope of eliminating systemic discrimination. Part II discusses moderate strategies that can be used to deflect the impact of Grutter’s prohibition on racial balance, suggesting that racial balancing can be restructured in ways that the Supreme Court may view as constitutional. Part III discusses more radical strategies that can be used to promote racial balance, and advocates a direct confrontation with the institution of judicial review in the context of affirmative action. The article concludes that the political branches of government possess the power to overcome Supreme Court impediments to racial justice, and hopes that they also possess the will to exercise that power

Effects of cumpulsory voting on visible minority representation

This thesis examines the effects of compulsory voting on visible minority representation in directly elected legislatures with proportional electoral systems. The hypothesis is that there compulsory voting creates a positive effect on visible minority representation. The results show that this is true, but the margin is so small that it is likely other factors have large amounts of influence as well. Some of these factors are discussed