2 research outputs found
A Network Monitoring Game with Heterogeneous Component Criticality Levels
We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network
that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In
this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors
to monitor the network against an attacker who strategically targets a network
component. The operator (resp. attacker) seeks to minimize (resp. maximize) the
network loss. To study the properties of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria of this
game, we first study two simple instances: (i) When component sets monitored by
individual sensor locations are mutually disjoint; (ii) When only a single
sensor is positioned, but with possibly overlapping monitoring component sets.
Our analysis reveals new insights on how criticality levels impact the players
equilibrium strategies. Next, we extend a previously known approach to obtain
an approximate Nash equilibrium for the general case of the game. This approach
uses solutions to minimum set cover and maximum set packing problems to
construct an approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we implement a column
generation procedure to improve this solution and numerically evaluate the
performance of our approach
Dynamic Games for Secure and Resilient Control System Design
Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composing
of cyber, physical, and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple
layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to
address cross-layer design issues related to security and resilience
challenges. To this end, game theory provides a bottom-up modeling paradigm to
capture the strategic interactions among multiple components of the complex
system and enables a holistic view to understand and design
cyber-physical-human control systems. In this review, we first provide a
multi-layer perspective toward increasingly complex and integrated control
systems and then introduce several variants of dynamic games for modeling
different layers of control systems. We present game-theoretic methods for
understanding the fundamental tradeoffs of robustness, security, and resilience
and developing a clean-slate cross-layer approach to enhance the system
performance in various adversarial environments. This review also includes
three quintessential research problems that represent three research directions
where dynamic game approaches can bridge between multiple research areas and
make significant contributions to the design of modern control systems. The
paper is concluded with a discussion on emerging areas of research that
crosscut dynamic games and control systems.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure