46 research outputs found

    Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity: Sybil-Resistant, Anonymous Authentication on Permissionless Blockchains and Incentive Compatible, Strictly Dominant Cryptocurrencies

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    Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity from trusted public certificates (e.g., national identity cards and/or ePassports; eSIM) is introduced here to permissionless blockchains in order to remove the inefficiencies of Sybil-resistant mechanisms such as Proof-of-Work (i.e., high energy and environmental costs) and Proof-of-Stake (i.e., capital hoarding and lower transaction volume). The proposed solution effectively limits the number of mining nodes a single individual would be able to run while keeping membership open to everyone, circumventing the impossibility of full decentralization and the blockchain scalability trilemma when instantiated on a blockchain with a consensus protocol based on the cryptographic random selection of nodes. Resistance to collusion is also considered. Solving one of the most pressing problems in blockchains, a zk-PoI cryptocurrency is proved to have the following advantageous properties: - an incentive-compatible protocol for the issuing of cryptocurrency rewards based on a unique Nash equilibrium - strict domination of mining over all other PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies, thus the zk-PoI cryptocurrency becoming the preferred choice by miners is proved to be a Nash equilibrium and the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy - PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies are condemned to pay the Price of Crypto-Anarchy, redeemed by the optimal efficiency of zk-PoI as it implements the social optimum - the circulation of a zk-PoI cryptocurrency Pareto dominates other PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies - the network effects arising from the social networks inherent to national identity cards and ePassports dominate PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies - the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence of a unique equilibrium where it dominates other forms of paymentComment: 2.1: Proof-of-Personhood Considered Harmful (and Illegal); 4.1.5: Absence of Active Authentication; 4.2.6: Absence of Active Authentication; 4.2.7: Removing Single-Points of Failure; 4.3.2: Combining with Non-Zero-Knowledge Authentication; 4.4: Circumventing the Impossibility of Full Decentralizatio

    A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks

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    © 2013 IEEE. The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of decentralized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review of the strategy adopted for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey of the emerging applications of blockchain networks in a broad area of telecommunication. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions

    PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN SCALABILITY: ADVANCEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE

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    In the last decade, blockchain has emerged as one of the most influential innovations in software architecture and technology. Ideally, blockchains are designed to be architecturally and politically decentralized, similar to the Internet. But recently, public and permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have faced stumbling blocks in the form of scalability. Both Bitcoin and Ethereum process fewer than 20 transactions per second, which is significantly lower than their centralized counterpart such as VISA that can process approximately 1,700 transactions per second. In realizing this hindrance in the wide range adoption of blockchains for building advanced and large scalable systems, the blockchain community has proposed first- and second-layer scaling solutions including Segregated Witness (Segwit), Sharding, and two-way pegged sidechains. Although these proposals are innovative, they still suffer from the blockchain trilemma of scalability, security, and decentralization. Moreover, at this time, little is known or discussed regarding factors related to design choices, feasibility, limitations and other issues in adopting the various first- and second-layer scaling solutions in public and permissionless blockchains. Hence, this thesis provides the first comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art first- and second-layer scaling solutions for public and permissionless blockchains, identifying current advancements and analyzing their impact from various viewpoints, highlighting their limitations and discussing possible remedies for the overall improvement of the blockchain domain

    SoK: Consensus in the Age of Blockchains

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    The core technical component of blockchains is consensus: how to reach agreement among a distributed network of nodes. A plethora of blockchain consensus protocols have been proposed---ranging from new designs, to novel modifications and extensions of consensus protocols from the classical distributed systems literature. The inherent complexity of consensus protocols and their rapid and dramatic evolution makes it hard to contextualize the design landscape. We address this challenge by conducting a systematization of knowledge of blockchain consensus protocols. After first discussing key themes in classical consensus protocols, we describe: (i) protocols based on proof-of-work; (ii) proof-of-X protocols that replace proof-of-work with more energy-efficient alternatives; and (iii) hybrid protocols that are compositions or variations of classical consensus protocols. This survey is guided by a systematization framework we develop, to highlight the various building blocks of blockchain consensus design, along with a discussion on their security and performance properties. We identify research gaps and insights for the community to consider in future research endeavours

    A Pattern Language for Blockchain Governance

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    Blockchain technology has been used to build next-generation applications taking advantage of its decentralised nature. Nevertheless, there are some serious concerns about the trustworthiness of blockchain due to the vulnerabilities in on-chain algorithmic mechanisms, and tedious disputes and debates in off-chain communities. Accordingly, blockchain governance has received great attention for improving the trustworthiness of all decisions that direct a blockchain platform. However, there is a lack of systematic knowledge to guide practitioners to perform blockchain governance. We have performed a systematic literature review to understand the state-of-the-art of blockchain governance. We identify the lifecycle stages of a blockchain platform, and present 14 architectural patterns for blockchain governance in this study. This pattern language can provide guidance for the effective use of patterns for blockchain governance in practice, and support the architecture design of governance-driven blockchain systems
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