Game Theoretic Model Predictive Control for Autonomous Driving

This study presents two closely-related solutions to autonomous vehicle control problems in highway driving scenario using game theory and model predictive control. We first develop a game theoretic four-stage model predictive controller (GT4SMPC). The controller is responsible for both longitudinal and lateral movements of Subject Vehicle (SV) . It includes a Stackelberg game as a high level controller and a model predictive controller (MPC) as a low level one. Specifically, GT4SMPC constantly establishes and solves games corresponding to multiple gaps in front of multiple-candidate vehicles (GCV) when SV is interacting with them by signaling a lane change intention through turning light or by a small lateral movement. SV’s payoff is the negative of the MPC’s cost function , which ensures strong connection between the game and that the solution of the game is more likely to be achieved by a hybrid MPC (HMPC). GCV’s payoff is a linear combination of the speed payoff, headway payoff and acceleration payoff. . We use decreasing acceleration model to generate our prediction of TV’s future motion, which is utilized in both defining TV’s payoffs over the prediction horizon in the game and as the reference of the MPC. Solving the games gives the optimal gap and the target vehicle (TV). In the low level , the lane change process are divided into four stages: traveling in the current lane, leaving current lane, crossing lane marking, traveling in the target lane. The division identifies the time that SV should initiate actual lateral movement for the lateral controller and specifies the constraints HMPC should deal at each step of the MPC prediction horizon. Then the four-stage HMPC controls SV’s actual longitudinal motion and execute the lane change at the right moment. Simulations showed the GT4SMPC is able to intelligently drive SV into the selected gap and accomplish both discretionary land change (DLC) and mandatory lane change (MLC) in a dynamic situation. Human-in-the-loop driving simulation indicated that GT4SMPC can decently control the SV to complete lane changes with the presence of human drivers. Second, we propose a differential game theoretic model predictive controller (DGTMPC) to address the drawbacks of GT4SMPC. In GT4SMPC, the games are defined as table game, which indicates each players only have limited amount of choices for a specific game and such choice remain fixed during the prediction horizon. In addition, we assume a known model for traffic vehicles but in reality drivers’ preference is partly unknown. In order to allow the TV to make multiple decisions within the prediction horizon and to measure TV’s driving style on-line, we propose a differential game theoretic model predictive controller (DGTMPC). The high level of the hierarchical DGTMPC is the two-player differential lane-change Stackelberg game. We assume each player uses a MPC to control its motion and the optimal solution of leaders’ MPC depends on the solution of the follower. Therefore, we convert this differential game problem into a bi-level optimization problem and solves the problem with the branch and bound algorithm. Besides the game, we propose an inverse model predictive control algorithm (IMPC) to estimate the MPC weights of other drivers on-line based on surrounding vehicle’s real-time behavior, assuming they are controlled by MPC as well. The estimation results contribute to a more appropriate solution to the game against driver of specific type. The solution of the algorithm indicates the future motion of the TV, which can be used as the reference for the low level controller. The low level HMPC controls both the longitudinal motion of SV and his real-time lane decision. Simulations showed that the DGTMPC can well identify the weights traffic vehicles’ MPC cost function and behave intelligently during the interaction. Comparison with level-k controller indicates DGTMPC’s Superior performance

Game Theoretic Model Predictive Control for Autonomous Driving

This study presents two closely-related solutions to autonomous vehicle control problems in highway driving scenario using game theory and model predictive control. We first develop a game theoretic four-stage model predictive controller (GT4SMPC). The controller is responsible for both longitudinal and lateral movements of Subject Vehicle (SV) . It includes a Stackelberg game as a high level controller and a model predictive controller (MPC) as a low level one. Specifically, GT4SMPC constantly establishes and solves games corresponding to multiple gaps in front of multiple-candidate vehicles (GCV) when SV is interacting with them by signaling a lane change intention through turning light or by a small lateral movement. SV’s payoff is the negative of the MPC’s cost function , which ensures strong connection between the game and that the solution of the game is more likely to be achieved by a hybrid MPC (HMPC). GCV’s payoff is a linear combination of the speed payoff, headway payoff and acceleration payoff. . We use decreasing acceleration model to generate our prediction of TV’s future motion, which is utilized in both defining TV’s payoffs over the prediction horizon in the game and as the reference of the MPC. Solving the games gives the optimal gap and the target vehicle (TV). In the low level , the lane change process are divided into four stages: traveling in the current lane, leaving current lane, crossing lane marking, traveling in the target lane. The division identifies the time that SV should initiate actual lateral movement for the lateral controller and specifies the constraints HMPC should deal at each step of the MPC prediction horizon. Then the four-stage HMPC controls SV’s actual longitudinal motion and execute the lane change at the right moment. Simulations showed the GT4SMPC is able to intelligently drive SV into the selected gap and accomplish both discretionary land change (DLC) and mandatory lane change (MLC) in a dynamic situation. Human-in-the-loop driving simulation indicated that GT4SMPC can decently control the SV to complete lane changes with the presence of human drivers. Second, we propose a differential game theoretic model predictive controller (DGTMPC) to address the drawbacks of GT4SMPC. In GT4SMPC, the games are defined as table game, which indicates each players only have limited amount of choices for a specific game and such choice remain fixed during the prediction horizon. In addition, we assume a known model for traffic vehicles but in reality drivers’ preference is partly unknown. In order to allow the TV to make multiple decisions within the prediction horizon and to measure TV’s driving style on-line, we propose a differential game theoretic model predictive controller (DGTMPC). The high level of the hierarchical DGTMPC is the two-player differential lane-change Stackelberg game. We assume each player uses a MPC to control its motion and the optimal solution of leaders’ MPC depends on the solution of the follower. Therefore, we convert this differential game problem into a bi-level optimization problem and solves the problem with the branch and bound algorithm. Besides the game, we propose an inverse model predictive control algorithm (IMPC) to estimate the MPC weights of other drivers on-line based on surrounding vehicle’s real-time behavior, assuming they are controlled by MPC as well. The estimation results contribute to a more appropriate solution to the game against driver of specific type. The solution of the algorithm indicates the future motion of the TV, which can be used as the reference for the low level controller. The low level HMPC controls both the longitudinal motion of SV and his real-time lane decision. Simulations showed that the DGTMPC can well identify the weights traffic vehicles’ MPC cost function and behave intelligently during the interaction. Comparison with level-k controller indicates DGTMPC’s Superior performance

A Human Driver Model for Autonomous Lane Changing in Highways: Predictive Fuzzy Markov Game Driving Strategy

This study presents an integrated hybrid solution to mandatory lane changing problem to deal with accident avoidance by choosing a safe gap in highway driving. To manage this, a comprehensive treatment to a lane change active safety design is proposed from dynamics, control, and decision making aspects. My effort first goes on driver behaviors and relating human reasoning of threat in driving for modeling a decision making strategy. It consists of two main parts; threat assessment in traffic participants, (TV s) states, and decision making. The first part utilizes an complementary threat assessment of TV s, relative to the subject vehicle, SV , by evaluating the traffic quantities. Then I propose a decision strategy, which is based on Markov decision processes (MDPs) that abstract the traffic environment with a set of actions, transition probabilities, and corresponding utility rewards. Further, the interactions of the TV s are employed to set up a real traffic condition by using game theoretic approach. The question to be addressed here is that how an autonomous vehicle optimally interacts with the surrounding vehicles for a gap selection so that more effective performance of the overall traffic flow can be captured. Finding a safe gap is performed via maximizing an objective function among several candidates. A future prediction engine thus is embedded in the design, which simulates and seeks for a solution such that the objective function is maximized at each time step over a horizon. The combined system therefore forms a predictive fuzzy Markov game (FMG) since it is to perform a predictive interactive driving strategy to avoid accidents for a given traffic environment. I show the effect of interactions in decision making process by proposing both cooperative and non-cooperative Markov game strategies for enhanced traffic safety and mobility. This level is called the higher level controller. I further focus on generating a driver controller to complement the automated car’s safe driving. To compute this, model predictive controller (MPC) is utilized. The success of the combined decision process and trajectory generation is evaluated with a set of different traffic scenarios in dSPACE virtual driving environment. Next, I consider designing an active front steering (AFS) and direct yaw moment control (DYC) as the lower level controller that performs a lane change task with enhanced handling performance in the presence of varying front and rear cornering stiffnesses. I propose a new control scheme that integrates active front steering and the direct yaw moment control to enhance the vehicle handling and stability. I obtain the nonlinear tire forces with Pacejka model, and convert the nonlinear tire stiffnesses to parameter space to design a linear parameter varying controller (LPV) for combined AFS and DYC to perform a commanded lane change task. Further, the nonlinear vehicle lateral dynamics is modeled with Takagi-Sugeno (T-S) framework. A state-feedback fuzzy H∞ controller is designed for both stability and tracking reference. Simulation study confirms that the performance of the proposed methods is quite satisfactory

Interaction-Aware Decision-Making for Autonomous Vehicles in Forced Merging Scenario Leveraging Social Psychology Factors

Understanding the intention of vehicles in the surrounding traffic is crucial for an autonomous vehicle to successfully accomplish its driving tasks in complex traffic scenarios such as highway forced merging. In this paper, we consider a behavioral model that incorporates both social behaviors and personal objectives of the interacting drivers. Leveraging this model, we develop a receding-horizon control-based decision-making strategy, that estimates online the other drivers' intentions using Bayesian filtering and incorporates predictions of nearby vehicles' behaviors under uncertain intentions. The effectiveness of the proposed decision-making strategy is demonstrated and evaluated based on simulation studies in comparison with a game theoretic controller and a real-world traffic dataset