2 research outputs found
A Full Key Recovery Attack on HMAC-AURORA-512
In this note, we present a full key recovery attack on HMAC-AURORA-512 when
512-bit secret keys are used and the MAC length is 512-bit long.
Our attack requires queries and the off-line complexity is AURORA-512 operations,
which is significantly less than the complexity of the exhaustive search for a 512-bit key.
The attack can be carried out with a negligible amount of memory.
Our attack can also recover the inner-key of HMAC-AURORA-384 with almost the same complexity as in HMAC-AURORA-512.
This attack does not recover the outer-key of HMAC-AURORA-384, but
universal forgery is possible by combining the inner-key recovery and 2nd-preimage attacks.
Our attack exploits some weaknesses in the mode of operation