Provable Data Possession at Untrusted Stores

We introduce a model for {\em provable data possession} (\pdp) that allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted server to verify that the server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks from the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data, which minimizes network communication. Thus, the \pdp model for remote data checking supports large data sets in widely-distributed storage systems. Previous work offers guarantees weaker than data possession, or requires prohibitive overhead at the server. We present two provably-secure \pdp schemes that are more efficient than previous solutions, even when compared with schemes that achieve weaker guarantees. In particular, the overhead at the server is low (or even constant), as opposed to linear in the size of the data. Experiments using our implementation verify the practicality of \pdp and reveal that the performance of \pdp is bounded by disk I/O and not by cryptographic computation