2 research outputs found
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret
Stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms are widely used in sponsored
search auctions, crowdsourcing, online procurement, etc. Existing stochastic
MAB mechanisms with a deterministic payment rule, proposed in the literature,
necessarily suffer a regret of , where is the number of
time steps. This happens because the existing mechanisms consider the worst
case scenario where the means of the agents' stochastic rewards are separated
by a very small amount that depends on . We make, and, exploit the crucial
observation that in most scenarios, the separation between the agents' rewards
is rarely a function of . Moreover, in the case that the rewards of the arms
are arbitrarily close, the regret contributed by such sub-optimal arms is
minimal. Our idea is to allow the center to indicate the resolution, ,
with which the agents must be distinguished. This immediately leads us to
introduce the notion of -Regret. Using sponsored search auctions as a
concrete example (the same idea applies for other applications as well), we
propose a dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually
rational (IR), deterministic MAB mechanism, based on ideas from the Upper
Confidence Bound (UCB) family of MAB algorithms. Remarkably, the proposed
mechanism -UCB achieves a -regret of for the case
of sponsored search auctions. We first establish the results for single slot
sponsored search auctions and then non-trivially extend the results to the case
where multiple slots are to be allocated
A Budget Feasible Peer Graded Mechanism For IoT-Based Crowdsourcing
We develop and extend a line of recent works on the design of mechanisms for
heterogeneous tasks assignment problem in 'crowdsourcing'. The budgeted market
we consider consists of multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices as
task executers; where each task requester is endowed with a single distinct
task along with the publicly known budget. Also, each IoT device has valuations
as the cost for executing the tasks and quality, which are private. Given such
scenario, the objective is to select a subset of IoT devices for each task,
such that the total payment made is within the allotted quota of the budget
while attaining a threshold quality. For the purpose of determining the unknown
quality of the IoT devices, we have utilized the concept of peer grading. In
this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism;
namely TUBE-TAP for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have
the true information about the quality of the IoT devices. The simulations are
performed in order to measure the efficacy of our proposed mechanism.Comment: In Version 2, errors are fixe