Global supply chains of high value low volume products

Imperial Users onl

A combinatorial approximation algorithm for CDMA downlink rate allocation

This paper presents a combinatorial algorithm for downlink rate allocation in Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) mobile networks. By discretizing the coverage area into small segments, the transmit power requirements are characterized via a matrix representation that separates user and system characteristics. We obtain a closed-form analytical expression for the so-called Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of that matrix, which provides a quick assessment of the feasibility of the power assignment for a given downlink rate allocation. Based on the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue, we reduce the downlink rate allocation problem to a set of multiple-choice knapsack problems. The solution of these problems provides an approximation of the optimal downlink rate allocation and cell borders for which the system throughput, expressed in terms of utility functions of the users, is maximized

Solving the Uncapacitated Single Allocation p-Hub Median Problem on GPU

A parallel genetic algorithm (GA) implemented on GPU clusters is proposed to solve the Uncapacitated Single Allocation p-Hub Median problem. The GA uses binary and integer encoding and genetic operators adapted to this problem. Our GA is improved by generated initial solution with hubs located at middle nodes. The obtained experimental results are compared with the best known solutions on all benchmarks on instances up to 1000 nodes. Furthermore, we solve our own randomly generated instances up to 6000 nodes. Our approach outperforms most well-known heuristics in terms of solution quality and time execution and it allows hitherto unsolved problems to be solved

Truthful Assignment without Money

We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism; for maximum weight bipartite matching, however, we show give a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism and show by a matching lowerbound that this is optimal. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which are APX-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy to reduce designing a truthful mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem, at a loss of a factor equal to the integrality gap in the approximation ratio. We use this technique to obtain strategyproof mechanisms with constant approximation ratios for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.Comment: Extended abstract appears in the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 201