9,483 research outputs found
Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid
The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication
technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security
and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee
operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the
smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model
the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers
and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the
design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing
protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of
the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will
discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing
multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page
Towards optimal multi-objective models of network security: survey
Information security is an important aspect of a successful business today. However, financial difficulties and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate security measures and keeping networked systems up and running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not address the challenging problem of security countermeasure selection. We have made a classification of security models, which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we have specified the challenges of the simplified risk assessment approaches used in the economic models and have made recommendations how the challenges can be addressed in order to support decision makers
Strategic Investment in Protection in Networked Systems
We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection
against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include
vaccination, computer security and airport security. Agents are connected
through a network and can fail either intrinsically or as a result of the
failure of a subset of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium based
on an agent's failure probability and derive conditions under which equilibrium
strategies are monotone in degree (i.e. in how connected an agent is on the
network). We show that different kinds of applications (e.g. vaccination,
malware, airport/EU security) lead to very different equilibrium patterns of
investments in protection, with important welfare and risk implications. Our
equilibrium concept is flexible enough to allow for comparative statics in
terms of network properties and we show that it is also robust to the
introduction of global externalities (e.g. price feedback, congestion).Comment: 32 pages, 3 figure
Toward optimal multi-objective models of network security: Survey
Information security is an important aspect of a successful business today. However, financial difficulties and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate security measures and keeping networked systems up and running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not address the challenging problem of security countermeasure selection. We have made a classification of security models, which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we have specified the challenges of the simplified risk assessment approaches used in the economic models and have made recommendations how the challenges can be addressed in order to support decision makers
Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS
The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings
up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way
toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the
attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional
methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical
foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and
decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to
capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a
defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of
security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable
security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides
an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of
incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a
modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will
also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can
address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge
between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory
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