233 research outputs found
Information-theoretic Physical Layer Security for Satellite Channels
Shannon introduced the classic model of a cryptosystem in 1949, where Eve has
access to an identical copy of the cyphertext that Alice sends to Bob. Shannon
defined perfect secrecy to be the case when the mutual information between the
plaintext and the cyphertext is zero. Perfect secrecy is motivated by
error-free transmission and requires that Bob and Alice share a secret key.
Wyner in 1975 and later I.~Csisz\'ar and J.~K\"orner in 1978 modified the
Shannon model assuming that the channels are noisy and proved that secrecy can
be achieved without sharing a secret key. This model is called wiretap channel
model and secrecy capacity is known when Eve's channel is noisier than Bob's
channel.
In this paper we review the concept of wiretap coding from the satellite
channel viewpoint. We also review subsequently introduced stronger secrecy
levels which can be numerically quantified and are keyless unconditionally
secure under certain assumptions. We introduce the general construction of
wiretap coding and analyse its applicability for a typical satellite channel.
From our analysis we discuss the potential of keyless information theoretic
physical layer security for satellite channels based on wiretap coding. We also
identify system design implications for enabling simultaneous operation with
additional information theoretic security protocols
A Cryptographic Treatment of the Wiretap Channel
The wiretap channel is a setting where one aims to provide information-theoretic privacy of communicated data based solely on the assumption that the channel from sender to adversary is ``noisier\u27\u27 than the channel from sender to receiver. It has been the subject of decades of work in the information and coding (I&C) community. This paper bridges the gap between this body of work and modern cryptography with contributions along two fronts, namely METRICS (definitions) of security, and SCHEMES. We explain that the metric currently in use is weak and insufficient to guarantee security of applications and propose two replacements. One, that we call mis-security, is a mutual-information based metric in the I&C style. The other, semantic security, adapts to this setting a cryptographic metric that, in the cryptography community, has been vetted by decades of evaluation and endorsed as the target for standards and implementations. We show that they are equivalent (any scheme secure under one is secure under the other), thereby connecting two fundamentally different ways of defining security and providing a strong, unified and well-founded target for designs. Moving on to schemes, results from the wiretap community are mostly non-constructive, proving the existence of schemes without necessarily yielding ones that are explicit, let alone efficient, and only meeting their weak notion of security. We apply cryptographic methods based on extractors to produce explicit, polynomial-time and even practical encryption schemes that meet our new and stronger security target
Principles of Physical Layer Security in Multiuser Wireless Networks: A Survey
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the domain of physical layer
security in multiuser wireless networks. The essential premise of
physical-layer security is to enable the exchange of confidential messages over
a wireless medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers without relying
on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved primarily in two ways: without
the need for a secret key by intelligently designing transmit coding
strategies, or by exploiting the wireless communication medium to develop
secret keys over public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the
foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and Wyner on
information-theoretic security. We then describe the evolution of secure
transmission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-antenna
systems, followed by generalizations to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access,
interference, and relay networks. Secret-key generation and establishment
protocols based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered.
Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are then examined, along
with a description of inter-disciplinary approaches based on game theory and
stochastic geometry. The associated problem of physical-layer message
authentication is also introduced briefly. The survey concludes with
observations on potential research directions in this area.Comment: 23 pages, 10 figures, 303 refs. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1303.1609 by other authors. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials,
201
Almost universal codes for fading wiretap channels
We consider a fading wiretap channel model where the transmitter has only
statistical channel state information, and the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper have perfect channel state information. We propose a sequence of
non-random lattice codes which achieve strong secrecy and semantic security
over ergodic fading channels. The construction is almost universal in the sense
that it achieves the same constant gap to secrecy capacity over Gaussian and
ergodic fading models.Comment: 5 pages, to be submitted to IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT) 201
"Pretty strong" converse for the private capacity of degraded quantum wiretap channels
In the vein of the recent "pretty strong" converse for the quantum and
private capacity of degradable quantum channels [Morgan/Winter, IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory 60(1):317-333, 2014], we use the same techniques, in particular the
calculus of min-entropies, to show a pretty strong converse for the private
capacity of degraded classical-quantum-quantum (cqq-)wiretap channels, which
generalize Wyner's model of the degraded classical wiretap channel.
While the result is not completely tight, leaving some gap between the region
of error and privacy parameters for which the converse bound holds, and a
larger no-go region, it represents a further step towards an understanding of
strong converses of wiretap channels [cf. Hayashi/Tyagi/Watanabe,
arXiv:1410.0443 for the classical case].Comment: 5 pages, 1 figure, IEEEtran.cls. V2 final (conference) version,
accepted for ISIT 2016 (Barcelona, 10-15 July 2016
Polynomial-Time, Semantically-Secure Encryption Achieving the Secrecy Capacity
In the wiretap channel setting, one aims to get information-theoretic privacy
of communicated data based only on the assumption that the channel from sender
to receiver is noisier than the one from sender to adversary. The secrecy
capacity is the optimal (highest possible) rate of a secure scheme, and the
existence of schemes achieving it has been shown. For thirty years the ultimate
and unreached goal has been to achieve this optimal rate with a scheme that is
polynomial-time. (This means both encryption and decryption are proven
polynomial time algorithms.) This paper finally delivers such a scheme. In fact
it does more. Our scheme not only meets the classical notion of security from
the wiretap literature, called MIS-R (mutual information security for random
messages) but achieves the strictly stronger notion of semantic security, thus
delivering more in terms of security without loss of rate
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