A Conditional Logic for Iterated Belief Revision

In this paper we (Laura Giordano, Nicola Olivetti and myself) propose a conditional logic to represent iterated belief revision systems. We propose a set of postulates for belief revision which are a small variant of Darwiche and Pearl's ones.The resulting conditional logic has a standard semantics in terms of selection function models, and provides a natural representation of epistemic states. A Representation Theorem establishes a correspondence between iterated belief revision systems and conditional models. Our Representation Theorem does not entail Gärdenfors' Triviality Result

On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators

Darwiche and Pearl’s seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most suggestions have resulted in a form of ‘reductionism’ that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals, such as the popular principle (P), aka ‘Independence’, characteristic of ‘admissible’ operators, remain commendably more modest. In this paper, we supplement the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states associated with a ‘proper ordinal interval’ (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of many AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for admissible operators in general

On strengthening the logic of iterated belief revision: proper ordinal interval operators

Darwiche and Pearl’s seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. However, most of the suggestions for doing so have been radical enough to result in a dubious ‘reductionist’ principle that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. The present paper offers a more modest strengthening of Darwiche and Pearl’s proposal. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the family that these principles characterise, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states that are associated with a ‘proper ordinal interval’ assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of a large number of AGM era postulates

Belief Revision with Uncertain Inputs in the Possibilistic Setting

This paper discusses belief revision under uncertain inputs in the framework of possibility theory. Revision can be based on two possible definitions of the conditioning operation, one based on min operator which requires a purely ordinal scale only, and another based on product, for which a richer structure is needed, and which is a particular case of Dempster's rule of conditioning. Besides, revision under uncertain inputs can be understood in two different ways depending on whether the input is viewed, or not, as a constraint to enforce. Moreover, it is shown that M.A. Williams' transmutations, originally defined in the setting of Spohn's functions, can be captured in this framework, as well as Boutilier's natural revision.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1996