Motivations, Values and Emotions: 3 sides of the same coin

This position paper speaks to the interrelationships between the three concepts of motivations, values, and emotion. Motivations prime actions, values serve to choose between motivations, emotions provide a common currency for values, and emotions implement motivations. While conceptually distinct, the three are so pragmatically intertwined as to differ primarily from our taking different points of view. To make these points more transparent, we briefly describe the three in the context a cognitive architecture, the LIDA model, for software agents and robots that models human cognition, including a developmental period. We also compare the LIDA model with other models of cognition, some involving learning and emotions. Finally, we conclude that artificial emotions will prove most valuable as implementers of motivations in situations requiring learning and development

Consciousness, Meaning and the Future Phenomenology

Phenomenological states are generally considered sources of intrinsic motivation for autonomous biological agents. In this paper we will address the issue of exploiting these states for robust goal-directed systems. We will provide an analysis of consciousness in terms of a precise definition of how an agent “understands” the informational flows entering the agent. This model of consciousness and understanding is based in the analysis and evaluation of phenomenological states along potential trajectories in the phase space of the agents. This implies that a possible strategy to follow in order to build autonomous but useful systems is to embed them with the particular, ad-hoc phenomenology that captures the requirements that define the system usefulness from a requirements-strict engineering viewpoint

A Cognitive Science Based Machine Learning Architecture

In an attempt to illustrate the application of cognitive science principles to hard AI problems in machine learning we propose the LIDA technology, a cognitive science based architecture capable of more human-like learning. A LIDA based software agent or cognitive robot will be capable of three fundamental, continuously active, humanlike learning mechanisms:\ud 1) perceptual learning, the learning of new objects, categories, relations, etc.,\ud 2) episodic learning of events, the what, where, and when,\ud 3) procedural learning, the learning of new actions and action sequences with which to accomplish new tasks. The paper argues for the use of modular components, each specializing in implementing individual facets of human and animal cognition, as a viable approach towards achieving general intelligence

LIDA: A Working Model of Cognition

In this paper we present the LIDA architecture as a working model of cognition. We argue that such working models are broad in scope and address real world problems in comparison to experimentally based models which focus on specific pieces of cognition. While experimentally based models are useful, we need a working model of cognition that integrates what we know from neuroscience, cognitive science and AI. The LIDA architecture provides such a working model. A LIDA based cognitive robot or software agent will be capable of multiple learning mechanisms. With artificial feelings and emotions as primary motivators and learning facilitators, such systems will ‘live’ through a developmental period during which they will learn in multiple ways to act in an effective, human-like manner in complex, dynamic, and unpredictable environments. We discuss the integration of the learning mechanisms into the existing IDA architecture as a working model of cognition

Interaction and Experience in Enactive Intelligence and Humanoid Robotics

We overview how sensorimotor experience can be operationalized for interaction scenarios in which humanoid robots acquire skills and linguistic behaviours via enacting a “form-of-life”’ in interaction games (following Wittgenstein) with humans. The enactive paradigm is introduced which provides a powerful framework for the construction of complex adaptive systems, based on interaction, habit, and experience. Enactive cognitive architectures (following insights of Varela, Thompson and Rosch) that we have developed support social learning and robot ontogeny by harnessing information-theoretic methods and raw uninterpreted sensorimotor experience to scaffold the acquisition of behaviours. The success criterion here is validation by the robot engaging in ongoing human-robot interaction with naive participants who, over the course of iterated interactions, shape the robot’s behavioural and linguistic development. Engagement in such interaction exhibiting aspects of purposeful, habitual recurring structure evidences the developed capability of the humanoid to enact language and interaction games as a successful participant

The implications of embodiment for behavior and cognition: animal and robotic case studies

In this paper, we will argue that if we want to understand the function of the brain (or the control in the case of robots), we must understand how the brain is embedded into the physical system, and how the organism interacts with the real world. While embodiment has often been used in its trivial meaning, i.e. 'intelligence requires a body', the concept has deeper and more important implications, concerned with the relation between physical and information (neural, control) processes. A number of case studies are presented to illustrate the concept. These involve animals and robots and are concentrated around locomotion, grasping, and visual perception. A theoretical scheme that can be used to embed the diverse case studies will be presented. Finally, we will establish a link between the low-level sensory-motor processes and cognition. We will present an embodied view on categorization, and propose the concepts of 'body schema' and 'forward models' as a natural extension of the embodied approach toward first representations.Comment: Book chapter in W. Tschacher & C. Bergomi, ed., 'The Implications of Embodiment: Cognition and Communication', Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 31-5

Synthetic Semiotics: on modelling and simulating the \ud emergence of sign processes

Based on formal-theoretical principles about the \ud sign processes involved, we have built synthetic experiments \ud to investigate the emergence of communication based on \ud symbols and indexes in a distributed system of sign users, \ud following theoretical constraints from C.S.Peirce theory of \ud signs, following a Synthetic Semiotics approach. In this paper, we summarize these computational experiments and results regarding associative learning processes of symbolic sign modality and cognitive conditions in an evolutionary process for the emergence of either symbol-based or index-based communication

Neuroethology, Computational

Over the past decade, a number of neural network researchers have used the term computational neuroethology to describe a specific approach to neuroethology. Neuroethology is the study of the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of behavior in animals, and hence it lies at the intersection of neuroscience (the study of nervous systems) and ethology (the study of animal behavior); for an introduction to neuroethology, see Simmons and Young (1999). The definition of computational neuroethology is very similar, but is not quite so dependent on studying animals: animals just happen to be biological autonomous agents. But there are also non-biological autonomous agents such as some types of robots, and some types of simulated embodied agents operating in virtual worlds. In this context, autonomous agents are self-governing entities capable of operating (i.e., coordinating perception and action) for extended periods of time in environments that are complex, uncertain, and dynamic. Thus, computational neuroethology can be characterised as the attempt to analyze the computational principles underlying the generation of behavior in animals and in artificial autonomous agents