The paper uses a range of primary-source empirical evidence to address the question:
‘why is it to hard to value intangible assets?’ The setting is venture capital investment in high technology companies. While the investors are risk specialists and financial
experts, the entrepreneurs are more knowledgeable about product innovation. Thus
the context lends itself to analysis within a principal-agent framework, in which
information asymmetry may give rise to adverse selection, pre-contract, and moral
hazard, post-contract. We examine how the investor might attenuate such problems
and attach a value to such high-tech investments in what are often merely intangible
assets, through expert due diligence, monitoring and control. Qualitative evidence is used to qualify the more clear cut picture provided by a principal-agent approach to a
more mixed picture in which the ‘art and science’ of investment appraisal are utilised
by both parties alik
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