How and why has the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) approach to military command evolved across its modern history against the backdrop of technological advancements? The PLA’s continued development of command capabilities, consisting of functional components of theories, structures, and systems that enable command, along with political work and human factors, will be consequential in shaping its future battlefield decision-making and performance. The prevalent perspectives articulated within salient academic literatures and among U.S. military observers have anticipated that the PLA, as a force subject to political control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), could struggle to innovate and would likely maintain a highly centralized, relatively inflexible approach to command, which could be disadvantageous in conflict. However, this dissertation contends such expectations about China’s command capabilities and its limited potential to achieve innovative developments should be reevaluated, in historical perspective and considering significant transformations ongoing in the PLA today. The reality is far more nuanced and reflects a system that, within certain limits, can be centrally controlled but also capable of facilitating greater initiative and decentralized warfighting. Indeed, the PLA’s approach to command has evolved dynamically in reaction to technological transformations that are expected to reshape future warfare. For the full extent of changes observed to occur without learning from and imminent pressures of conflict and despite expected bureaucratic impediments, is puzzling relative to prevailing expectations. The adaptations and innovations that have emerged across multiple aspects of Chinese military command are tantamount to a revolution in command with significant implications for Chinese military power. The existing literature provides several alternative explanations, to include the influence of strategic culture, dynamics of civil-military relations, organizational explanations, and military learning through emulation. However, I contend the impacts of ideation about technology in future warfare, as constructed through expert networks reacting to leadership guidance, can provide a more compelling explanation for the full extent of changes in Chinese military command and constitutes a dynamic that can be generalizable to other major domains of Chinese innovation. In the process, Chinese leaders have tended to adjust styles of command across domains and levels of warfare in a manner that balances between political control and autonomy based on a calculus of risks and benefits.
This dissertation introduces a theory of command innovation based on ideation that accounts for major changes in China’s approach to military command. Chapter 1 and 2 introduce that theory and its primary mechanism, examining the process through which ideation about technology in future warfare takes shape through a dynamic involving not only high-level direction on priorities from senior leadership but also construction and socialization of new concepts among key strategic, military, and scientific experts. In the process, I argue the PLA tends to be informed by not only its study of global trends in technology and assessments of foreign military approaches but also its uniquely scientific outlook on warfare, as reflected in its evolving approach within the discipline of military command science. Chapters 3-7 center on a series of case studies examining each major functional component of Chinese command capabilities, based on an approach of process tracing that considers changes in Chinese command concepts, structures, political work, systems, and approach to human factors (i.e., training and education of commanders) respectively. To that end, I leverage a range of primary source materials, including close reading of Chinese military textbooks, journals, and media products, as well as vignettes from Chinese military history and contemporary operations. Chapter 8 continues by examining current debates and the ideation process ongoing today within the Chinese military and scientific spheres focused on implications of artificial intelligence (AI) for future warfare. The final chapter concludes by considering how this theory of command innovation contributes to literatures on military and defense innovation, while evaluating theoretical generalizability and implications.
This dissertation also seeks to contribute to understanding the implications of these trends for the future of command and evolving military balance. Across recent decades, the PLA has pursued informatization (信息化), an agenda centered on leveraging information technology as a core enabler of military power, which has reshaped dynamics of command. Presently, the PLA is pursuing an agenda of military intelligentization (智能化) to capitalize upon advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and related technologies. These trends have generated debates within the PLA on the complex interplay of human factors and technology, which PLA scientists and strategists believe necessitates renewed emphasis on human-machine integration, especially in command. Among impactful applications are support to military decision-making, including through automated processing and integration of intelligence information. Looking forward, Chinese leaders regard emerging capabilities as critical to contesting advantage in future conflict scenarios, yet the ultimate impacts on the military balance remain uncertain. Such uncertainty about impacts of disruptive technologies and their applications could increase the risks of misperception, especially as international competition intensifies, and could exacerbate security dilemmas. PLA efforts to operationalize new complex systems might increase frictions that could undercut intended advantages for decision-making, while potentially increasing the possibility of accidents, crisis instability, or misperceptions. In this regard, the PLA’s evolving approach to command decision-making also has significant implications for future strategic stability and deterrence.Governmen
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