\u3cem\u3eYounger\u3c/em\u3e and Older Abstention

Abstract

When victims of systemic rights violations in state criminal proceedings seek federal court relief, governmental defendants often ask federal courts to abstain for reasons of federalism. These arguments frequently disregard the Supreme Court’s emphasis that abstention is a narrow exception to federal courts’ duty to exercise jurisdiction. Lower federal courts are increasingly employing a form of “free-floating federalism,” diverging from the Supreme Court’s careful balance between comity and individual rights. This has led to lower courts’ significant expansion of criminal abstention doctrine, leaving severe irreparable harm unaddressed in an increasingly broad range of settings, such as pretrial detention and child welfare proceedings. Given the federal judiciary’s increased emphasis on tradition in interpreting contemporary equitable remedies, this Article contrasts these novel expansions with historical equitable practices. While the doctrine of criminal abstention is now known as “Younger abstention” after the 1971 case Younger v. Harris, criminal abstention and its core exceptions originate from centuries-old equitable proceedings in both the United States and England. Historically, courts of equity intervened in ongoing criminal proceedings when those proceedings were inadequate to redress harm or irreparable harm would otherwise result. Similarly, in the decades after the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts balanced federal constitutional rights against state interests in ways that accounted for a federal judicial role in ending great irreparable harm. The most recent lower court expansions of the doctrine are in severe tension with that tradition