Azioni abituali. Razionalità e implicazioni morali

Abstract

This paper explores the increasing interest in habitual actions within contemporary philosophy, particularly in action theory and moral psychology. Traditional approaches in analytic philosophy have focused on distinguishing intentional actions, based on reasons, from mere events. However, this intellectualist perspective often overlooks habitual actions, which are not fully intentional but also not merely automatic responses. Habitual actions are purposeful, can be justified by reasons (though these may remain unconscious), and are partially subject to conscious control. Recent philosophical approaches – for instance, those related to discussions of moral behavior – emphasize the practical intelligence inherent in habitual actions, challenging conventional models and fostering interdisciplinary connections with cognitive science and social psychology. This renewed interest in habitual actions calls for a reevaluation of traditional paradigms, offering a more dynamic and integrated understanding of human action, where automaticity and conscious control coexist