Essays on success factors in imperfect markets for corporate control

Abstract

Markets for corporate control can foster innovation and growth due to the reallocation of resources and are thus vital for the efficiency of global economies. But, to efficiently reallocate resources, markets for corporate control have to be efficient themselves. The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on both, inefficiencies such as persistent principle-agent conflicts and the effect of the regulatory environment on corporate transactions in Germany. The first section serves as an introduction to reflect on research regarding corporate transactions, the principle- agent theory and market regulations as well as to summarize the three research papers and their current publication status. The first paper focusses on the effect of personal preferences of target CEOs on corporate transactions and is presented in the second section. Based on these insights, the second paper is dedicated to Fairness Opinions and their effect on corporate transactions and is presented in the third section. To further analyze the regulatory environment, the third paper focusses on legal thresholds that bidders have to surpass to gain full control over targets in the German market for corporate control and is presented in the fourth section