Navigation Warfare

Abstract

This working paper briefly presents the navigation warfare as attack method against the positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) of navigation satellites such as the US-owned Global Positioning System (GPS) as the leading Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) network. Positioning and navigation are vital for navigators in cars, ships, and airplanes. The timing of GPS e.g., provides valid timestamps for stock trading, for reliable real-time data in energy grids, for synchronization of IT systems and cellular networks for smartphones. For the military, GPS is e.g., essential for precision-guided weapons and in Outer Space, it is needed for launches, orbit determination and control of satellite constellations. Meanwhile, further GNSS systems were launched, such as Galileo (Europe), Beidou (China) and the Global Navigation Satellite System GLONASS (Russia). Growing concerns are expressed about an over-reliance on GPS as jamming and spoofing attacks against GPS are increasing. Jamming is the deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to block GPS-signals while GPS spoofing uses fake signals to send an incorrect position and/or timing. GPS Jamming and Spoofing are mainly executed in regional conflicts. The Ukraine and Gaza wars have significantly deteriorated the situation. GPS jamming can affect many systems such as Automatic Identification systems (AIS) in ships which can result in ship collisions and accidents. Civilian airflights are also massively affected by GPS jamming and spoofing. Since September 2023, a 500% increase in GPS spoofing has been observed with around 1500 spoofed flights per day in August 2024. From 15 July to 15 August 2024, a total of 41,000 flights experienced spoofing as a collateral effect of military activities. This causes severe risks for civilian airflights by affecting the landing phase and even after return of the correct GPS signals, some aircraft systems may still work with the false data (GPS contamination). A key finding is that it is currently not possible to isolate the GPS receiver from other aircraft systems. The Navigation Warfare defense against jamming and spoofing aims to eliminate electromagnetic noise from jamming and false signals from spoofing. The main methods are encryption which allows receivers to select the correct signal and stronger GPS signals. The new generation of GPS IIIF satellites will be hardened against cyber attacks and radiation. Further measures aim to modernize or to replace GPS, such as adaptive antenna arrays, narrowband frequency filters, and integration with inertial sensors which provide additional PNT information. Furthermore, additional signals from other GNSS systems (multi-GNSS) and from other sensors or equipment (multi-PNT) can be used. As an alternative to GPS, the US military develops quantum navigation chips. The expanding satellite-based internet based on Starlink, Spacesail and Oneweb will make the internet more vulnerable for jamming and spoofing. The navigation warfare issues that are currently limited to the GPS system will then be relevant for other areas as well. While the research and development for Navigation Warfare defense is in progress, the increased and widespread use of jamming and spoofing indicates the need for more defense technologies