Old Wine in a New Bottle? – An Empirical Evaluation of the Judicial Reforms in China in the 2010s

Abstract

This article provides an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the judicial reform measures implemented in China in the 2010s. Among other objectives, the reforms aimed to strengthen the independence of judges, the financial autonomy of courts and the professionalism of adjudicators. Critics have questioned the success of the reforms, citing continued government intervention with adjudication and unchanged structural problems with courts. To date, there has been limited empirical literature focusing specifically on the judicial reform measures in the 2010s in China. This article provides a glimpse into what really was happening on the ground since the reforms through the lens of frontline judges. It concludes that the reforms have enhanced the financial autonomy of courts, the independence of individual adjudicators and the quality of judgments. 47% of the judges who responded to the survey agreed that the judicial reform was extremely effective. However, this study also reveals that the reforms failed to tackle deep-seated problems of the Chinese judiciary. Local government intervention with adjudication is still rampant. Courts continued to be severely understaffed. Judges are still ready to abridge procedures to arrive at an outcome that is consistent with the policy of the court leadership. While the reform is not “old wine in a new bottle”, there is still much room for improvement in the administration of justice in China