Corporate governance issues in family and non-family owned firms: an empirical analysis of CEO compensation, executive turnover, and earnings management

Macciocchi, Daniele

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oai:eprints.luiss.it:1339

Corporate governance issues in family and non-family owned firms: an empirical analysis of CEO compensation, executive turnover, and earnings management

Authors: Daniele Macciocchi
Publication date: 10 June 2014
Publisher: 'EMW Publishing'

Abstract

Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.LUISS PhD Thesi

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