This thesis consists in three essays that study the linkages between real and financial factors
from different perspectives. Chapter 1, co-authored with Ester Faia and Valeria Patella, introduces
a full set of ambiguity attitudes, which endogenously induces agents' optimism in booms
and pessimism in recessions, in a model where borrowers face occasionally binding collateral
constraints. We use GMM techniques with latent value functions to estimate the ambiguity
attitudes process, showing that agents update their belief over the credit cycle in a way coherent
with our preferences specification. By simulating a crisis scenario, we show that optimism
in booms is responsible for strong leverage build-up before the crises while pessimism in recessions
implies sharper de-leveraging and asset price bursts. Analytically and numerically, using
global non-linear methods, we show that our ambiguity attitudes coupled with the collateral
constraints help to explain relevant asset price and leverage cycle facts around the unfolding of
financial crises. Chapter 2, co-authored with Carmelo Salleo, studies the strategic interactions
between monetary and macroprudential authorities through the lens of an open-economy monetary
model featuring trade and financial
ows between two symmetric countries. Characterizing
a set of Within-Country Cooperative and Nash Equilibria for different degrees of trade and financial
integration, the analysis identifies large costs associated to the strategic interaction between
the domestic authorities. Moreover, the gains from cooperation are strongly affected by the degree
of cross-country integration and by the channel through which the integration is realized:
larger trade
ows reduce the gains, while higher financial globalization makes cooperation more
valuable. Then, moving to a Between-Countries Cooperative and Nash Equilibria analysis, we
confirm that cooperation is beneficial from both the country-specific and the global perspective.
Chapter 3, co-authored with Javier Ojea Ferreiro and Elena Rancoita proposes an innovative
methodology for the design of adverse scenarios for macroprudential policies calibration and
impact assessment. Our methodology allows building tailored scenarios characterized by two
main features. First, there is a stable and transparent mapping of the cyclical systemic risk level
into the path of the scenario's target variables, which are those variables that determine the
overall scenario's severity. Second, the path of the other complementary variables is calibrates
with a multivariate copula model estimated with macro and financial data (MacroFin Copula).
Simulating the model for Euro Area countries, we show that our methodology is able to calibrate
adverse scenarios that properly replicate the global financial crises dynamics in terms of
severity and co-movement between the key macroeconomic and financial variables.This thesis consists in three essays that study the linkages between real and financial factors
from different perspectives. Chapter 1, co-authored with Ester Faia and Valeria Patella, introduces
a full set of ambiguity attitudes, which endogenously induces agents' optimism in booms
and pessimism in recessions, in a model where borrowers face occasionally binding collateral
constraints. We use GMM techniques with latent value functions to estimate the ambiguity
attitudes process, showing that agents update their belief over the credit cycle in a way coherent
with our preferences specification. By simulating a crisis scenario, we show that optimism
in booms is responsible for strong leverage build-up before the crises while pessimism in recessions
implies sharper de-leveraging and asset price bursts. Analytically and numerically, using
global non-linear methods, we show that our ambiguity attitudes coupled with the collateral
constraints help to explain relevant asset price and leverage cycle facts around the unfolding of
financial crises. Chapter 2, co-authored with Carmelo Salleo, studies the strategic interactions
between monetary and macroprudential authorities through the lens of an open-economy monetary
model featuring trade and financial
ows between two symmetric countries. Characterizing
a set of Within-Country Cooperative and Nash Equilibria for different degrees of trade and financial
integration, the analysis identifies large costs associated to the strategic interaction between
the domestic authorities. Moreover, the gains from cooperation are strongly affected by the degree
of cross-country integration and by the channel through which the integration is realized:
larger trade
ows reduce the gains, while higher financial globalization makes cooperation more
valuable. Then, moving to a Between-Countries Cooperative and Nash Equilibria analysis, we
confirm that cooperation is beneficial from both the country-specific and the global perspective.
Chapter 3, co-authored with Javier Ojea Ferreiro and Elena Rancoita proposes an innovative
methodology for the design of adverse scenarios for macroprudential policies calibration and
impact assessment. Our methodology allows building tailored scenarios characterized by two
main features. First, there is a stable and transparent mapping of the cyclical systemic risk level
into the path of the scenario's target variables, which are those variables that determine the
overall scenario's severity. Second, the path of the other complementary variables is calibrates
with a multivariate copula model estimated with macro and financial data (MacroFin Copula).
Simulating the model for Euro Area countries, we show that our methodology is able to calibrate
adverse scenarios that properly replicate the global financial crises dynamics in terms of
severity and co-movement between the key macroeconomic and financial variables.LUISS PhD Thesi
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