On cosmos and concepts

Abstract

Priority monists maintain that the most fundamental concrete thing is the entire cosmos. However, in contrast with existence monists, priority monists hold that other objects, including medium-sized objects such as tables, exist in exactly the same way as the cosmos. They hold the metametaphysical view that the job of metaphysics is to organize the ontology of the world into hierarchical relations; they are neo-Aristotelians. And, on the most natural reading of priority monism, wholes are more fundamental than parts. Here, I attempt to show that these commitments lead the priority monist into an inescapable trilemma. My argument will focus upon the fact that a priority monist must make room in her ontology for a certain kind of structured mental object, i.e. concepts. But, I shall argue, because of the nature of concepts, every way a priority monist can possibly fit them into her hierarchical ontology leads her to untenable conclusions