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The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

By Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Abstract

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agen- das of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or e¤ectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation repres- ented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is e¤ectively dictatorial

Topics: BC Logic
Publisher: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:20067
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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