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Endogenous lobbying

By Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo


In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process

Topics: HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform, HB Economic Theory, HF5601 Accounting
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2003
OAI identifier:
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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