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Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy

By Paul Heidhues and Nicolas Melissas

Abstract

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.Information Externality; Strategic Waiting; Delay; Information Cascade; Investment Boom; Optimal Taxation

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Citations

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