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How are Oil Revenues redistributed in an Oil Economy? The case of Kazakhstan

By Boris Najman, Richard Pomfret, Gael Raballand and Patricia Sourdin

Abstract

Kazakhstan’s economy has been driven by an oilboom since the discovery of large new oilfields coincided with the upturn of world oil prices after 1998. This paper uses national household expenditure survey data to examine whether Kazakhstan’s experience supports a curse or a blessing outcome. We assess the extent to which the benefits from the oilboom are retained in the oil-producing regions, or spread evenly across the national economy, or are concentrated in the cities where the country’s elite lives. We then analyze the data to determine the transmission mechanisms (higher wages, social transfers or informal income) from the oilboom to household expenditure.resource boom; redistribution

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