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Dogmatism and the distinctiveness of opposite v. different cognitive system: release from proactive inhibition for shifts within- and between-dimensions of meaning

By Martin F. Davies

Abstract

In a series of three experiments, encoding distinctiveness in a release from proactive inhibition paradigm was investigated as a function of dogmatism. Significant differences in release from proactive inhibition between high and low dogmatic individuals were found for shifts within meaning dimensions (from one end of a dimension to the other end) but not for shifts between different dimensions of meaning. The results were discussed in terms of the emphasis on belief vs. disbelief systems in dogmatism, motivational processes in cognition, and recent work on differences in social cognition

Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.gold.ac.uk:34

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