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Two Kinds of Concept: Implicit and Explicit

By Dr. Gualtiero Piccinini

Abstract

In his refreshing and thought-provoking book, Edouard Machery (2009) argues that people possess different kinds of concept. This is probably true and important. Before I get to that, I will briefly disagree on two other points

Topics: Philosophy of Mind
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:6836

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Citations

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