Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Spectacular pehnomena and limits to rationality in genetic and cultural evolution

By Magnus Enquist, Anthony Arak, Stefano Ghirlanda and Carl-Adam Wachtmeister

Abstract

In studies of both animal and human behaviour, game theory is used as a tool for understanding strategies that appear in interactions between individuals. Game theory focuses on adaptive behaviour, which can be attained only at evolutionary equilibrium. Here we suggest that behaviour appearing during interactions is often outside the scope of such analysis. In many types of interaction, conflicts of interest exist between players, fueling the evolution of manipulative strategies. Such strategies evolve out of equilibrium, commonly appearing as spectacular morphology or behaviour with obscure meaning, to which other players may react in non-adaptive, irrational way approach, and outline the conditions in which evolutionary equilibria cannot be maintained. Evidence from studies of biological interactions seems to support the view that behaviour is often not at equilibrium. This also appears to be the case for many human cultural traits, which have spread rapidly despite the fact that they have a negative influence on reproduction

Topics: Ethology, Animal Cognition, Sociobiology, Evolution, Neural Nets, Theoretical Biology, Animal Behavior
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:5277
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://cogprints.org/5277/1/en... (external link)
  • http://cogprints.org/5277/ (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    Citations

    1. (1955). A behavioural model of rational choice.
    2. (1986). A brood parasitic catfish of mouthbrooding cichlid fishes in lake tanganica.
    3. (1975). A note on the evolutionary significance of “supernormal stimuli.
    4. (1993). AI: the tumultuous history of the search for artificial intelligence,
    5. (1979). Arms races between and within species.
    6. (1995). Conflict, receiver bias and the evolution of signal form.
    7. (1983). Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games.
    8. (1990). Female preference predates the evolution of the sword in swordtail fish.
    9. (1980). Mimicry and the evolutionary process.
    10. (1987). Modeling rational players. Part I.
    11. (1998). Modelling bounded rationality.
    12. (1998). Parasitic birds and their hosts.
    13. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment.
    14. (1986). Rationality and bounded rationality.
    15. (1975). Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.
    16. (1973). Relationships between exploratory behaviour and fear: a review.
    17. (2000). Sexual conflict promotes speciation in insects.
    18. (1990). Sexual selection for sensory exploitation in the frog Physalaemus pustulosus.
    19. (1988). The birds of the western
    20. (1998). The demographic transition: are we any closer to an evolutionary explanation?

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.