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'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness

By Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich Hoche

Abstract

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation

Topics: Philosophy of Mind
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:4748

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