Exploring the RTI (real-time incentive) tariff-based approach to single-species fisheries management

Abstract

In the recently proposed real-time incentives (RTI) fisheries management approach fishers would be allocated fishing-impact credits ('RTIs') to spend according to spatiotemporally varying tariffs. RTI-quota and tariffs would be based on commercial stock targets, and tariffs could be updated based on real-time CPUE data. The fisher could dynamically choose how to spend his RTIs, e.g. by limited fishing in sensitive areas and fishing longer in less sensitive areas. Using a conceptual simulation framework we explore the feasibility of RTI-management given potential responses by fishermen and have a look at the internal dynamics of the system. In particular, we consider various tactical decision-making strategies that may be used by fishermen to optimise their fishing activities within the system. In addition, we explore RTI-management in the context of the classical mixed-fisheries problem, where restricting fishing mortality of a vulnerable "choke" species could unnecessarily restrict fishing on other species. We find that the adaptive management explicit in the RTI-system can, in principle, cope with various forms of tactical fisher behaviour, even misreporting, and that the system responds in a coherent and understandable way. We show that RTI-management can, in principle, to a large extent overcome the classical mixed-fisheries problem, since the fishing mortality of a "choke" species can be controlled while simultaneously allowing fishing opportunity for other species. We discuss our findings as a first step of explorations needed towards testing the RTI-system in the context of its practical implementation. © 2014 Elsevier B.V