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Dominance Solvable Games with Multiple Payoff Criteria.

By Georgios Gerasimou

Abstract

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria

Publisher: University of St Andrews
Year: 2014
OAI identifier: oai:repo.sire.ac.uk:10943/588
Provided by: SIRE

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