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Partnership, ownership and control: the impact of corporate governance on employment relations

By S. Deakin, R. Hobbs, Suzanne J. Konzelmann and F. Wilkinson

Abstract

Prevailing patterns of dispersed share ownership and rules of corporate governance for UK listed companies appear to constrain the ability of managers to make credible, long-term commitments to employees of the kind needed to foster effective labour-management partnerships. We present case study evidence which suggests that such partnerships can nevertheless emerge where product market conditions and the regulatory environment favour a stakeholder orientation. Proactive and mature partnerships may also be sustained where the board takes a strategic approach to mediating between the claims of different stakeholder groups, institutional investors are prepared to take a long-term view of their holdings, and strong and independent trade unions are in a position to facilitate organisational change

Topics: man
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.bbk.ac.uk.oai2:304

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  1. 2 per cent. Dividend per share increased by an average 12.7 per cent per annum over the five years to 2000. At Hearwell dividend per share increased by 7.4 per cent in the 2000 financial year whereas underlying earnings per share fell by 2.2 per cent. doi
  2. (1997). 35 per cent ; doi
  3. (1997). 35 per cent; 1998: 23 per cent; 1999: 23 per cent 2000: 30 per cent. Two US institutions held 15 per cent of the capital shares (8 per cent of voting shares) in doi
  4. 402 institutional holdings and 18 per cent in 1,751,341 individual holdings.
  5. (2000). finan c i a l year Warmw e l l ’ s unde r ly i ng earni n g s per share fell by 2.6 per cent (for all UK busine s s e s earni n g s per share incre a s e d by 1.4 per cent), but divide n d per share incre a s e d by
  6. (2000). financial year Warmwell’s underlying earnings per share fell by 2.6 per cent (for all UK businesses earnings per share increased by 1.4 per cent), but dividend per share increased by doi
  7. inst i tut i o n a l hold i ng s and 18 per cent
  8. (1998). Letter from the Secretary of State for Health to the Head of Health, UNISON,
  9. (1999). OFGEM recogn i s e s that the figure s it uses ‘may diffe r subst a n t i a l l y ’ from the actua l level s paid out by the electr i c i t y comp an i e s : Distribution Price Control Review
  10. (1999). OFGEM recognises that the figures it uses ‘may differ substantially’ from the actual levels paid out by the electricity companies: Distribution Price Control Review
  11. (1999). OFWAT Periodic Review doi
  12. se c t i o n 2, para g r a p h 5.79 . doi
  13. (1999). section 2, paragraph 5.79. See also PFI Projects:
  14. (1999). See for exa mpl e OFGEM Guaranteed and Overall Standards of Performance
  15. (1999). See for example OFGEM Guaranteed and Overall Standards of Performance
  16. (1995). The limit s of statu t o r y trade union recogni t i o n’
  17. (1995). The limits of statutory trade union recognition’
  18. (2001). The releva n t legis l a t i o n was contai n e d in the Emp l oy men t Rela ti o n s Act 1999; see genera l l y Brown et al.,
  19. (2001). The relevant legislation was contained in the Employment Relations Act 1999; see generally Brown et al.,
  20. (2000). ther e were 531, 0 00 hold i n g s of Warmw e l l sh ar e s , 79 per cent of them UK based and 21 per cent US based . At
  21. (2000). there were 531,000 holdings of Warmwell shares, 79 per cent of them UK based and 21 per cent US based. At
  22. (2000). This is a refe re n c e to the common practi c e of quarte r l y asses s me n t s of the perfor ma n c e of fu nd manag e r s (see Sling e r and Deak i n ,
  23. (2000). This is a reference to the common practice of quarterly assessments of the performance of fund managers (see Slinger and Deakin,
  24. (2001). This is suppo r t e d by the co mme n t of one of H earwe l l ’ s leadin g shareh o l d e r s , with a stak e of more than 2 per cent, that ‘we’r e cert a i n l y not beari s h on telec o m s when you take a mediu m- t e r m view ’
  25. (2001). This is supported by the comment of one of Hearwell’s leading shareholders, with a stake of more than 2 per cent, that ‘we’re certainly not bearish on telecoms when you take a medium-term view’
  26. (2000). Towar d s a stake h old e r theor y of the firm: the Saturn partners h i p ’
  27. (2000). Towards a stakeholder theory of the firm: the Saturn partnership’ doi

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