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Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis

By Silvia Marchesi

Abstract

The existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an IMF programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model. If countries who have arrangements with the IMF are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an IMF programme could work as a sort of signal of a country’s “good willingness”, which is thus rewarded with the debt relief. The results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors.IMF Conditionality, Debt Rescheduling, Bivariate probit

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