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The yield/quality trade-off and contractual choice

By Marta Fernandez Olmos, Jorge Rosell-Martinez and Manuel Antonio Espitia-Escuer

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the choice of governance mechanism in agriculture using an integrated perspective based on agency theory. The main ways of organizing agriculture are compared: spot market and incentive contract. With the analytical development of both models, it is explored that the choice of the optimal mechanism depends on initial conditions such as uncertainty, the risk aversion of the agents or the number of competitors. Moreover, according to the predictions made by the economic literature on agrarian organization, the results support the coexistence of both governance alternatives.Crop Production/Industries,

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