Article thumbnail

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AND PROPERTY RIGHTS FORMATION IN RURAL CHINA

By Loren Brandt, Scott Rozelle and Matthew A. Turner

Abstract

We examine the ongoing transition from centrally planned to market agriculture in rural China. In particular, we examine the devolution of land rights from village governments to villagers and the corresponding evolution of tenure security in agricultural land. We find econometric support for the statistical and economic importance of four explanations for local government behavior. Three of these explanations indicate a link between the incentives and con-straints faced by village leaders and property rights in agricultural land, and hence suggest policy levers to encourage more secure property rights.Land Economics/Use, Public Economics,

OAI identifier:
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://purl.umn.edu/11988 (external link)

  • To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.

    Suggested articles