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Partial cross-ownership and strategic environmental policy

By Juan Carlos Bárcena Ruiz and María Luz Campo Corredera


This paper analyzes the effect that passive investment in rival firms has on the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes. We consider two firms located in different countries, one of which owns a stake in its rival. We show that partial cross-ownership affects the taxes set by the countries in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Depending on the stake that one firm has in its rival we show that cooperative taxes may he higher or lower than non-cooperative taxes. Moreover, for intermediate values of the stake, the non-cooperative tax is higher in one country and lower in the other than the cooperative tax.environmental taxes, international trade, local pollution, partial ownership

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