Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games

By Julio Gonzalez-Diaz and Miguel Melendez-Jimenez

Abstract

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.non-cooperative game theory, equilibrium concepts, perfect bayesian, Bayes rule.

OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (2007). Discrete Extensive Form Games,” Mimeo. ———
  2. (1985). Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium
  3. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,
  4. (1995). Microeconomic Theory,
  5. (1964). Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games,”
  6. (1991). Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium,”
  7. (2010). Perfect Regular Equilibrium,” Mimeo.
  8. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games,”
  9. (1981). Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information,”
  10. (1996). Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria,”
  11. (2003). The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information:
  12. (1995). The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization,”

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.