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Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring

By John G. Sessions and Nikolaos Theodoropoulos

Abstract

We undertake the first empirical investigation of the relationship between the slope of the wagetenure profile and the level of monitoring. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we hypothesise that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wagetenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.efficiency wages; tenure; monitoring

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