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Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities

By Antonio Quesada

Abstract

When players may have lexicographic utilities, there are: (i) extensive games having a non-empty set of equilibria but empty sets of sequentially rational, sequential and perfect equilibria (ii) normal form games having a non-empty set of equilibria but an empty set of proper equilibria and no stable set of equilibria and (iii) two extensive games having the same normal form representation and disjoint sets of sequential equilibria.lexicographic expected utility

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Citations

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