Location of Repository

Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models .

By Utku Unver and Hervé Crès

Abstract

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 — 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (dideology, mean voter theorem, spatial voting, super majority;

OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

Preview

Citations

  1. (1976). A Multidimensional Statistical Procedure for Spatial Analysis’, manuscript,
  2. (1981). A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition’,
  3. (1967). A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under the Majority Rule’,
  4. (1991). Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem’,
  5. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy.
  6. (1997). Analytical Politics. New York:
  7. (2004). Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting: France 1946–1958’,
  8. (2007). Changing Minds? Not in
  9. (1997). Congress: A Political-economic History of Roll-call Voting.
  10. (1979). Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives’,
  11. (1997). Cre `s
  12. (1997). Income Redistribution and the Realignment of American Politics.
  13. (1974). On a Class of Rational Decision Procedures’,
  14. (1988). On the 64%-majority Rule’,
  15. (1991). Patterns of Congressional Voting’,
  16. (2006). Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting.
  17. (2009). Production in Incomplete Markets: Expectations Matter for Political Stability’,
  18. (1995). Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model’,
  19. (2005). Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting.
  20. (2004). The Core of Social Choice Problems with Monotonic Preferences and Feasibility Constraints’,
  21. (1994). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion
  22. (1976). The Spatial Theory of Elections: A Review and a Critique’, in
  23. (1984). The Spatial Theory of Voting. New York:

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.