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By Roland Kirstein and Robert Cooter


Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium. -- Anti-Sharing kann das Teilungsproblem der Teamproduktion lösen: Die Teammitglieder versprechen dem Antisharer zunächst einen fixen Betrag. Der Anti-Sharer bekommt den tatsächlichen Teamoutput und zahlt dessen Wert an jedes Teammitglied aus (vermindert um die fixe Zahlung). Wir zeigen, daß der Anti-Sharer im Gleichgewicht unproduktiv ist.team production,sharing problem,bonding,theory of the firm

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