Location of Repository

The Effects of Preference Characteristics and Overconfidence on Economic Incentives

By Florian Englmaier

Abstract

This dissertation is a collection of three independent research papers and three chapters with surveys introducing into the respective literature. The first paper analyses the effects of introducing Inequity Aversion in a Moral Hazard Problem, the second paper is about optimal delegation in groups involved in contests, and the third paper is about the optimal delegation decision of firms who can hire possibly overconfident managers.Incentives; Inequity Aversion; Contracts; Strategic Delegation; Overconfidence

OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

Preview

Citations

  1. (1989). Anomalies: Interindustry Wage Dierentials,'
  2. (1981). Are we all less risk and more skillful than our fellow drivers?,'
  3. (2001). Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture,'
  4. (1985). Delegation and the theory of the
  5. (1980). Ecient Rent Seeking'
  6. (1996). Economics of Convention,'
  7. (1994). Equity: In Theory and Practice (Princeton NJ:
  8. (1988). Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health,'
  9. (1995). Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers,'
  10. (1997). R&D in a strategic delegation game,'
  11. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events'

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.