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Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.

By Tristan Tomala

Abstract

This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring; Communication equilibria;

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