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The Two-dimensional Model of Jury Decision Making

By Manfred J. Holler

Abstract

This paper discusses a two-dimensional jury model. It combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model assumes a first mover, the plaintiff, and a second-mover, the counsel of the defendant. Typically, these agents represent parties that have conflicting interests. Here they face a jury that consists of three groups of voters such that no single group has a majority of votes. Each group is characterized by homogeneous preferences on three alternatives that describe the possible outcomes. The outcome is selected by a simple majority of the jury members. The agents are interested in both gaining the support of a majority of jury members and seeing their preferred alternative selected as outcome. It will be demonstrated that equilibrium decision making can be derived for this model.Condorcet's Jury Theorem, Voting Paradox, majority cycle, aggregation of preferences, agenda setting, collective decision making.

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