The securitisation of the United Kingdom's maritime infrastructure during the 'war on terror'

Abstract

This thesis examines counter-terrorism efforts in relation to the United Kingdom's ports and harbours (its 'maritime infrastructure') in the context of the 'war on terror'. To do this the thesis utilises the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory as the analytical frameowrk through which a case study, focusing on developments in a five year period between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2009 and utilising the cases of Felixstowe, Holyhead and Tilbury, is undertaken. The thesis argues that UK maritime infrastructure was securitised in the context of the macrosecuritisation of the 'civilised way of life', which were in a mutually reinforcing relationship. By reorienting emphasis towards the 'post-securitised environment' and on to examining what securitisations 'do' in practice, the thesis subsequently demonstrates the substantial impact of securitisation on the management of UK maritime infrastructure. More specifically it argues that a counter-terrorism security response was evident which constantly evolved, was layered and increasingly expansive in scope and that had a series of prominent, recurring features. The thread which ran through this response was the pursuit of increased power in relation to UK maritime infrastructure, undertaken by the British state and port owners in particular. The thesis concludes by noting how the key findings of the case study progressively demonstrate a greater level of complexity to the securitisation of UK maritime infrastructure than can at first be apparent